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We reconsider the case for constructing a port in the city of Gaza, and more 
generally for a future Palestinian State controlling independently its vital economic 
interests. We construct a theoretical example that demonstrates that the notion of 
economic sovereignty is compatible with modern economic theory: essentially, a 
State should have sovereign power over its vital economic interests just as a 
company should acquire property rights over specific assets of strategic importance. 
The theoretical example yields two main results: firstly, Israel and Palestine will not 
be able to realise a peace dividend without Palestine having some economic 
sovereignty. Secondly, strategic assets generate value by enabling trade, but their 
separate records are likely to show accounting losses. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The basic dilemma concerning economic relations between Israel and a (future) 
Palestinian state is the extent to which the two units should be economically integrated 
(or separated). On the one hand, it is argued that integration would generate more gains 
from trade, facilitate economic growth and maximise the peace dividend. On the other 
hand, it is argued that Israeli occupation has undermined economic development in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and that some separation is needed in order to turn things 
around. The former is sometimes considered as the economic approach, while the latter is 
sometimes described as an ‘alternative’ approach, which puts politics before economics. 
Indeed, as we shall see below, at least in some cases the international development 
agencies have used the ‘economic argument’ in order to advocate more economic 
integration. 
 
At the heart of the debate lies the notion of economic sovereignty: the view that countries 
should have sovereign power over their vital interests, in particular strategic assets like 
ports, power stations, telecommunication systems and maybe some key industries. 
Indeed, most economists are hostile to the notion of economic sovereignty, believing that 
it serves a nationalistic, rather than an economic, purpose. Some might even argue that 
traditional economic theory cannot accommodate the notion of economic sovereignty: 
scarce resources should be allocated according to comparative advantage rather than 
some perceived strategic value.  
 
The purpose of this short note is to point out that modern economic theory does not rule 
out a priori the notion of economic sovereignty (although it certainly does not argue that 
every asset is strategic and that countries should be autarchic with respect to every 
industry). Essentially, we argue that the notion of economic sovereignty is isomorphic to 
that of private property. It is well understood by now that firms may be forced to own and 
control certain assets rather than buy the services from external suppliers. This is because 
they cannot write down complete contracts that would protect them against opportunistic 
behaviour by these suppliers.
1 Clearly, sovereign parties face even greater difficulties 
when they try to protect vital interests by way of a contract.   
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We use the port of Gaza as a leading example, although we believe that the argument is 
applicable more broadly. From the very beginning of the Oslo peace process,
2 the 
Palestinians considered a port in the city of Gaza to be an economic interest of vital 
economic importance. Most of the economists involved in the peace process considered 
such a port an extravagant symbol of national sovereignty which a poor Palestine could 
ill afford. It was argued that since ports are prone to significant scale economies, and 
since the nearby Israeli port of Ashdod still had excess capacity, buying services from 
Israel would prove more cost-effective.  
 
In our view, this argument was based on narrow technological considerations and ignored 
the strategic issues that arise when contracts are incomplete. We construct a simple 
theoretical example where investment in strategic assets may actually facilitate, rather 
than impede, trade among nations. To understand why, suppose that the peace dividend is 
generated by a Palestinian development project that yields some exportable goods. 
Hence, the project is strongly complemented by a service generated by a specific asset, a 
port through which the goods are shipped to foreign markets. Now suppose that the 
Israeli port of Ashdod has excess capacity (even if it was operating at full capacity, due to 
significant scale economies in the technology of operating harbours it would be cheaper 
to expand capacity in Ashdod rather than construct a new port in Gaza). Hence, in a first-
best world the parties may benefit from trading port services. 
 
Note, however, that such a trade presupposes the ability to contract upon, and enforce, the 
‘access fee’ to the port. Suppose, to the contrary, that contracts are incomplete or un-
enforceable. In that case, the access price will be determined according to the ex post 
bargaining power of the parties. Possibly, that price will fail to compensate the home 
country for the sunk cost of its investment in the development project. If that is foreseen 
in advance, the whole deal will fall apart and the potential peace dividend will never 
materialise. In such a world, the only remedy may be to locate another port within the 
sovereign territory of Palestine. Obviously, such a solution will decrease the peace 
dividend; however, a decreased peace dividend may be better than no peace dividend.  
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One practical implication from our analysis is that accounting-based rates of return on the 
port will fail to capture its social welfare. We highlight this result by the following 
argument: a port in Gaza may stand idle as Palestinian exporters use cheap port services 
in Israel; a Gaza port is nevertheless essential in preventing Israel from behaving 
opportunistically and charging fees that drive the ex-post rate of return on the 
development project down to zero.  
 
Our analysis is an application of the property-rights incomplete-contracts literature. It is 
interesting to note, however, that while Hart (1995) emphasises the ‘under-investment’ 
result, ours is an over-investment result: second best investment is higher than first-best 
investment. In that respect, our result is closer to the ‘strategic excess capacity’ result, 
derived in the context of international trade; see Tirole (1988). It is also interesting to 
note the relation of our analysis to the sovereign-debt literature; see Fernandez and Eaton 
(1995). Note, however, that the latter literature emphasises that sovereignty is an obstacle 
to trade, because it weakens enforcement. While we agree with this observation, we point 
out that, given that the parties are sovereign and enforcement is already weak, 
strengthening the sovereign position of the weaker party may balance the relationship and 
thus ease, rather than disrupt, trade among nations. 
 
This note is organised as follows: more details on the Oslo Declaration of Principles 
(DOP) and on the Gaza port decision can be found in Section 2. Section 3 contains a very 
simple example indicating that a Gaza port might have made sense. A brief conclusion is 
provided in Section 4. 
  
2  SOME HISTORY OF THE GAZA PORT  
The Gaza port is already mentioned in the DoP signed first in Oslo and then in 
Washington on 13 September 1993. The economic section of the declaration states that 
there will be ‘co-operation in the field of transport and communications, including a 
Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area’.
3 
The issue of a port in Gaza receives more detailed attention in the Interim Agreement of 
28 September 1995. It is stated that ‘plans for the establishment of a port in the Gaza  
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Strip in accordance with the DOP … will be discussed and agreed upon between Israel 
and the Council.’
4 To resolve the security issues, it was agreed that ships would have to 
harbour first in an Israeli port.  
 
However, the Gaza port was never built, partly because of the recommendations of the 
international development agencies. It is well known that ports are prone to significant 
economies of scale, which imply, according to standard analysis, that one is better than 
two. Thus, for example, a report by the Armand Hammer fund calculates that the ‘use of 
[the] Ashdod Port would cost [neighbouring Arab] countries (Jordan and Iraq) at least $7 
per ton [i.e. 50%] less than the use of a yet un-built Gaza port’ (net of investment 
required to expand capacity at Ashdod). Indeed, the report states explicitly that the 
construction of a port in Gaza can be justified only on the grounds of ‘non-economic 
considerations’.
5 More significantly, the World Bank has argued that other infra-structure 
projects such as roads, water treatment facilities and housing were more urgently needed. 
This is because ‘the region is presently served by modern facilities in the existing Israeli 
ports on the Mediterranean coast and the Port of Eilat and the Jordanian Port of Aqaba in 
the Gulf of Aqaba. Therefore, the economic viability of a new port at Gaza will need to 
be assessed within the regional context. However, [the report still mentions that] the 
Palestinians consider the port an essential element.’
6 
 
Unfortunately, this optimistic spirit of co-operation has never materialised. The year 1994 
saw some of the worse acts of violence so far in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, committed by extremists from both sides, a violence that has been escalating 
ever since. In response, the Israeli government has implemented a policy of closures, 
preventing Palestinian access to Israeli territory in general, and particularly to the port of 
Ashdod. The Israeli government has usually argued that the measures are necessary for 
security reasons, but the Palestinians have always argued that the closures are ineffective 
security-wise, and are rather a means to penalise the Palestinian civil population, or even 
worse to pressure it towards renegotiating the Oslo agreement. As we shall see below, an 
important aspect of our theoretical argument is that no third party can verify such claims. 
It is telling, however, that some outsiders found them to be credible.
7 For example, the  
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head of the World-Bank delegation to the West Bank and Gaza argued that ‘the Paris 
Protocol created a de-facto customs union. But a union that works presupposes mutual 
interests, good will and an environment of trust and respect. This environment had eroded 
over the past two years. Increasingly adversarial relationships between the Palestinian 
Authority and the Israeli Government put a customs union implementation at risk. … 
Private Israeli-Palestinian trade relations are close and in many cases parties are satisfied. 
However, when the interests are not identical, the Palestinians have little control. Israeli 
commercial interests can be advanced either by various traditional obstacles (port delays, 
claims of failures to meet standards, etc.) or by means of other barriers and costs, which 
may be intertwined with security or safety procedures. Israel defends its fiscal interests 
by enforcing limits on Palestinian direct imports, by its control of external market access 
and its control of all import tax remittances, essential to Palestinian fiscal health.’
8 
 
3 THE  MODEL 
In this section we present a simple example that uses incomplete-contract theory to argue 
that a port in Gaza would make economic sense in a second-best world where inter-state 
enforcement mechanisms are weak.  
 
The setting 
There are two periods: ex ante and ex post. The real interest rate is assumed to be zero. 
There are two players: {i,p}, which we dub ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’, respectively. Ex ante, 
player p can implement a development project, which costs c ex ante, and would yield an 
output d > c ex post. We may think of the development project as either public (eg 
infrastructure, training and education programmes) or private (new business implemented 
in a decentralised manner with aggregate yield and cost of d and c). We also assume that 
the output of the project is an export commodity so that realising the income is contingent 
upon accessing foreign markets. We interpret (d - c) as a ‘peace dividend’. 
 
To reach the international markets, player p must access a harbour from where the goods 
can be shipped abroad. Now suppose that player i has a harbour which is in excess 
capacity. For simplicity, the existing capacity of i’s harbour is sufficient to accommodate  
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all of p’s exports at a shadow-price of zero. More specifically, we assume that player p 
can access i’s port at a zero marginal cost, without any additional investment in 
infrastructure. In contrast, it is costly for player p to construct its own harbour: we 
assume that the fixed cost of a new harbour is k; the marginal cost of exporting goods via 
the new harbour is assumed to be zero. Obviously, in a first-best world, investing in a 
new harbour is wasteful. However, we assume that the surplus generated by the project is 
large enough to cover the cost of constructing a harbour, namely, 
 
(1)  d - c - k > 0. 
 
We also assume that there is a production lag in the construction of the harbour: it has to 
be built ex ante so as to be operational ex post when the project comes on stream. 
 
Clearly, p’s access to i’s port needs to be guaranteed by way of a contract at the time that 
the investment decision is made. However, contracts are valid only to the extent that they 
can be enforced. Obviously, international transactions are notorious for the weakness of 
their enforcement mechanisms, and we assume that no contractual obligation is 
enforceable internationally. However, we assume that the international community can 
punish any action of one player against the territory of the other. We discuss this 
assumption further in the next sub-section. 
 
Our last assumption is that player i has all the bargaining power both ex ante and ex post. 
This assumption is made for simplicity: the result will not change qualitatively if we 
allocate the bargaining power more evenly. As it happens, the assumption is not at odds 
with the Israeli-Palestinian reality. 
 
First best 
It has already been noted that there is no first-best rationale for player p to construct a 
harbour in its own territory. Therefore, the only purpose of the present sub-section is to 
explain what contracts and enforcement mechanisms are required to support the first-best 
outcome. Hence, assume for the time being that everything is contractible and  
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enforceable. We shall argue, at the end of this subsection, that this assumption is not very 
realistic, for it assumes a powerful and well-informed enforcement agency, a 
counterfactual. 
 
The first-best contract contains an access-price t*, at which player p may export its goods 
via player i’s harbour. Under the assumption that i has all the bargaining power, t* is 
trivial to compute: 
 
(2)  t* = Min(d - c, k) = k. 
 
That is, player i uses his bargaining power to extract all the surplus from the transaction, 
subject to the constraint that player p cannot be charged more than the cost of 
constructing its own harbour. Using equation (1) we get that the second constraint is 
binding. 
 
Obviously, the contract should require that while player p crosses i’s territory it obeys i’s 
traffic laws, its pollution standards and safety requirements, as well as abstaining from 
any criminal activity. If not, player i may use its sovereign power to stop player p from 
accessing the harbour. These conditions may seem technical, but they are not. Ex post, 
player i will try to behave opportunistically, and renegotiate the access price t upwards. 
Since c is already a sunk-cost, and since the option of building a harbour is no longer 
available, there is nothing that prevents player i from renegotiating the access price up to 
d.
9 The practical way to do this is by using the ‘law abiding’ clauses in the contract as an 
excuse for stopping player p from crossing i’s territory to access the harbour. Note that 
even if there exists an international agency that is responsible for enforcing the contract, 
it is unlikely to be able to establish whether denying access is strategic or justifiable 
under the law-abiding clauses. In the language of the incomplete-contracts literature, 
player p’s conduct within player i’s territory is ‘observable but not verifiable.’ 
 
Second best  
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It is quite obvious that once player p foresees that player i would behave opportunistically 
and will expropriate the peace dividend, it will not invest in the development project. But 
it is quite obvious that had player p been allowed to construct its own harbour, it would 
collect a surplus of 
  
d - c - k > 0. 
 
Hence, building its own port, though first-best wasteful, is second-best welfare 
enhancing, supporting international trade between player p and the rest of the world. 
 
Three points are worthy of some elaboration. First, note that it is likely that the port will 
lose money. The reason is the following: suppose that player p supplies port-services to 
its own citizens at some fee tp > 0. Whatever this fee is, player i would have an incentive 
to undercut it. This is because its own harbour is in excess capacity; at a zero marginal 
cost, it is profitable to expand traffic at any positive price. The exact equilibrium price 
depends on how we model the oligopolistic competition among the two players. Let us 
note that under the plausible assumption of Bertrand competition, the equilibrium fee t
*
p 
would be zero. Thus, from an accounting point of view the harbour is a pure waste of 
money. Hence, standard net-present-value rules for evaluating investment projects may 
not be valid for strategic assets in a second-best world. In our setting, the value of the 
harbour is not captured by the cash-flow that it (does not) generate, but rather by the fact 
that it prevents player i from behaving opportunistically. Without such a guarantee, 
player p cannot implement its development project.  
 
Secondly, comparing the first and the second best, it is easy to see that player p’s profits 
are the same. Hence, the whole dead-weight loss, k, resulting from the contractual 
imperfection falls on player i. If player i could pre-commit itself not to behave 
opportunistically towards player p, it could collect the amount that player p spends (in the 
second-best world) on constructing the harbour. Also, comparing the ‘no project’ state 
with the second best, it is easy to see that player i has no share in the peace dividend, and 
is thus indifferent to whether the development project is implemented or not. It is easy,  
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however, to amend the example giving player i some bonus in case the development 
project is implemented. (It can be interpreted as profits of i’s suppliers to p’s producers 
while operating the project.) Once that is done, it is actually in i’s best interest to allow 
the construction of a port so as to pre-commit itself not to behave opportunistically and to 
enable the generation of the peace dividend both for its own and its neighbour’s sake.  
 
Thirdly, it is worth noting that the second best arrangement (trade supported by a 
strategic asset) works under the crucial assumption that player i will not use its military 
power to block player p’s harbour because the international community is able to stop 
such an action. Why would the international community stop an action of player i against 
the territory of player p, but not enforce a contract that allows player p access to player i’s 
harbour? The reason is that when player i denies access to the harbour, the international 
community cannot verify whether this action is opportunistic, or whether it is a 
‘justifiable’ response to player p breaching the ‘law abiding’ condition in the contract. 
We believe that this is, essentially, what happened in the Israeli-Palestinian case. Israel 
denied the Palestinians access to Israeli harbours on grounds of defence against terrorism. 
While terrorism was a fact, it was impossible to establish whether the Israeli steps were 
genuine, or whether these were opportunistic steps intended to renegotiate the contract. 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
We have started this paper by identifying two seemingly conflicting views regarding the 
desired economic relations between Israel and an independent Palestine: on the one hand, 
the economic approach that recommends integration so as to maximise the peace 
dividend; on the other hand, the ‘alternative’ approach that argues that integration would 
lead to Israel’s continued control of Palestine, which would undermine the latter’s 
economic development (as it has done in the past). 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a synthesis of the two approaches. We have 
shown that modern economic theory does not support a priori the view that the optimal 
level of integration is full integration. In a sense, the analysis implies that one cannot 
clearly distinguish between the economic and the political aspects of Israeli-Palestinian  
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relations. We have constructed a simple example where allowing Palestine to hold a 
strategic asset separately from Israel is a necessary condition for the generation of the 
peace dividend. Investment in the strategic asset is justified even though the actuarial rate 
of return on the asset is likely to be negative. Hence, a certain amount of separation is 
actually a necessary condition not just for the political stability of an Israeli-Palestinian 
peace treaty, but in also in order to support international trade between Palestine and the 
rest of the world.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the analysis is not limited to the port of Gaza alone. 
Rather, we use the port of Gaza as a leading example that helps to explain what we mean 
by ‘strategic assets’. It is obvious that the port is not unique. The argument would apply 
immediately to other border points, such as airfields or land exits. Indeed, any asset or 
policy that may be used by Israel in order to disrupt the normal operation of the 
Palestinian economy should count as well. For example, internal routes within the 
Palestinian territory that are used for the delivery of labour, raw materials and finished 
goods may also be considered strategic. Indeed, we have observed in recent years many 
cases where such roads were blocked in order to impose internal closures, with enormous 
damage to the Palestinian economy. 
 
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that our argument is not in favour of 
autarchy, but rather in favour of trade and co-operation supported by the establishment of 
sovereign power over strategic assets. It is worth repeating some of the key assumptions. 
Firstly, strategic assets have some crucial technological properties; most importantly they 
strongly complement a broad range of economic activity, and they are specific in the 
sense of not having any close substitute. Secondly, we deal with parties emerging out of a 
long and bloody conflict, having no mutual trust, goodwill or reputation on which co-
operation could be maintained. Thirdly, the parties are highly asymmetric. It follows 
from our technological assumptions that while Israel may hold up Palestine, the converse 
is unlikely. It is only the interaction of the technological and the political factors that 
makes certain assets strategic in nature.  
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Lastly, we would like to raise the following question: why should the above analysis be 
applied to Israel and Palestine, but not to peaceful neighbouring countries in, say, 
Western Europe? The answer is that our game-theoretic model is well suited to capture 
the state of conflict within which Israel and Palestine operate. Probably, a more peaceful 
situation is characterised by some additional factors that would allow the parties to 
establish a co-operative solution. Some ‘social capital’ of good will or reputation may be 
one of these factors. Another may be a web of interwoven interests between individuals 
within those countries so that a majority of people in both countries lose from breaking 
down the relations. Analytically, modelling the co-operative solution is probably a more 
demanding task than modelling the conflict. Unfortunately for Israel and Palestine, we 
have not yet reached the point where dealing with such an analytical challenge is a matter 
of practical urgency.  




1 See Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), and Hart (1995). 
2 For more background see Arnon et. al. (1997). 
3 Article 5, Annex III-Protocol. 
4 Annex 1, Article XIV, paragraph 4. 
5 See Ben-Shahar, Fishelson, and Hirsch (1989), p.141. 
6 See World Bank (1993). 
7 Arguably, the government sought concessions payable in political rights rather than 
money, but this bears little effect on the analysis.  
8 Dr. Joe Saba, the Resident Mission Director of the World Bank in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, in a speech delivered in Nablus on September 29
th, 1998. Quoted in the 
Palestine Economic Pulse, 3: 5, September- October 1998, pp.4-5. 
9 Payment may be extracted in kind, an interpretation that fits better the description in 
section 2: according to the Palestinian side, Israel’s closure policy was intended to 
renegotiate the Oslo agreement and extract more concessions, territorial and other.  
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